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Abstract. An online survey system provides a convenient way for peo-
ple to conduct surveys. It removes the necessity of human resources to
hold paper surveys or telephone interviews and hence reduces the cost
significantly. Nevertheless, accuracy and privacy remain as the major ob-
stacles that need additional attention. To conduct an accurate survey,
privacy maybe lost, and vice versa. In this paper, we provide new in-
sight to preserve these two seeming contradictory issues in online survey
systems especially suitable in big data era. We propose a secure sys-
tem, which is shown to be efficient and practical by simulation data.
Our analysis further shows that the proposed solution is desirable not
only in online survey systems but also in several potential applications,
including E-Voting, Smart-Grid and Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks.
1 Introduction
Privacy has always been considered as a significant issue in our daily life. As an
age-old concern, it is not unique in the digital world but the advances in digital
technologies have brought an array of new privacy challenges. The granularity
(or depth) of information captured in the digital world and the rapid information
dissemination facilitated by the Internet are factors that contribute most to those
new privacy concerns.
Online Survey System. One of the situations that privacy plays an important
factor is an online survey system. An online survey system (e.g., Kwik Survey
[15], My3q [23] or Survey Monkey [30]) is an Internet surveying technique in
which the interviewee follows a script provided in a website. The questionnaires
are created in a program for creating web interviews. The program allows for the
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questionnaire to contain pictures, audio and video clips, or links to different web
pages. The website is able to customize the flow of the questionnaire based on the
answers provided, as well as information already known about the participant.
It is considered to be a cheaper way of conducting surveys since it does not
require any human resources to conduct surveys or telephone interview. With
the increasing use of the Internet, online questionnaires have become a popular
way of collecting information. The design of an online questionnaire often has
an effect on the quality of data gathered. There are many factors in designing an
online questionnaire, and issues including guidelines, available question formats,
administration, accuracy and privacy should be carefully addressed. Here we
focus on the last two factors.
A survey form may collect the interviewee’s personal particulars, such as
sex, age, salary range and interest. Such information may be very useful for the
interviewer to conduct a survey with accurate information. However, the inter-
viewer has no way to verify the authenticity of this information. For example, a
15 years old boy may say that “she” is a 50 years old woman earning one mil-
lion US dollars per annual. This may not be possible if a face-to-face survey or
telephone interviewing survey is carried out, or at least to some certain extent.
Nevertheless, in a virtual world such as Internet, anonymity without authenti-
cation means the source is highly questionable. Furthermore, this 15 years old
boy may fill in the online survey multiple times. Next time he may pretend he
is a retired 80 years old man. There is no way to verify whether these 2 different
surveys are from the same source or not.
Digital signature provides an easy and convenient way to authenticate the
message sender in the Internet. By digitally signing a message (the survey), the
verifier (the interviewer) can be convinced that the sender is a person with true
particulars provided. Using the above example, assume Bob is that 15 years old
boy. If he signs the survey, the interviewer may check his certificate (or identity
if ID-based signature [29] is used) to find out his personal information from the
certificate authority (or private key generator for ID-based signature). He cannot
pretend to be another person. If he conducts the survey more than once, it will
be easily detected since the signature contains the information of the signer.
It seems that digital signature can easily solve the problem of accuracy. How-
ever, on the other side, signing the survey means the loss of privacy. In reality,
many users are not willing to reveal their real identities to interviewers due to
privacy concerns. If it is a compulsory requirement for conducting the survey,
they will decline the survey invitation. It maybe the main reason that many
existing online survey systems do not compulsorily require interviewees to input
their real identifying information (or no need to verify their information, e.g.,
no email validation is required).
Contributions. In this paper, we provide a new insight to preserve accuracy
and privacy in online survey systems. We propose a new system which provides
the following desirable features:
1. Authentication: It allows only those authenticated or qualified users to
take part into the survey.
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2. Anonymity: No one knows the identity of the user who has submitted the
survey.
3. Detection of double submission: No one can submit more than once in
a single survey event without being detected.
4. Unlinkability: Given two surveys from two different events, no one can tell
whether they are from the same user.
5. Constant Complexity: The complexity of our system is independent to
the total number of users in the system. Thus it is particularly suitable for
any system with large user database in the big data analytic era.
We provide a concrete instantiation of our system. Further, we show our system
to be efficient and practical by some simulation data analysis.
We believe our proposed system can fully resolve the contradiction between
accuracy and privacy in online survey system. We also suggest other practical
applications that can employ our system with only slightly modification required.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some related works
will be given in Section 2. Section 3 reviews the preliminaries required in this
paper. In Section 4 we give an overview of our scheme, which is followed by
detail description in Section 5. We present other applications that can deploy
our primitive in Section 6 and conclude our paper in Section 7.
2 Related Works
There are many ways to resolve the contradiction between user privacy and data
accuracy. Several solutions have been proposed and notable examples include
ring signatures [27, 6] and group signatures [8, 2]. In ring signatures, one can
spontaneously form a group of possible signers and sign on behalf of the group
anonymously. One can also use group signatures to sign on behalf of a group of
possible signers, but group signatures require an initial group setup procedure
performed by the group manager who can revoke the anonymity of any group
signer.
Attribute-Based Signatures [28, 16, 22, 26] (or, ABS for short) is another
primitive proposed to provide signer anonymity. As a versatile primitive, ABS
allows an entity to sign a message with fine-grained control over identifying in-
formation. A valid ABS signature attests to the fact that “A single user, whose
attributes satisfy the predicate, has endorsed the message”. Ring signatures and
group signatures are then comparable to special cases of ABS, in which the only
allowed predicates are disjunctions over the universe of attributes (identities).
In ABS, each entity possesses a set of attributes and a key-authority generates
the associated private keys, with which one can sign a message with a predi-
cate satisfied by his/her attributes. The signature reveals no more than the fact
that a single user with some set of attributes satisfying the predicate has at-
tested to the message. In particular, ABS does not provide any information on
the particular set of attributes used to satisfy the predicate. For example, an
“(Engineer, Department A)” or an “(Engineer, Department B)” can independently
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generate an ABS to assure the recipient that the signature was produced by an
“Engineer” without disclosing the department information. Furthermore, users
of ABS cannot collude to pool their attributes together (which separates ABS
from mesh signatures): It is never possible for an “(Engineer, Department A)”
and an “(Auditor, Department B)” to collude and generate an ABS satisfying the
predicate “(Auditor, Department A)”.
Yet all these solutions cannot resolve the contradiction. They are not practical
enough to be used in an online survey system. For example, in a ring signature,
it requires the signer to know all other members within the group. It is obvious
impossible for an interviewee to know all other interviewee in a survey. For group
signature, the properties of the group have to be fixed at the beginning. That is,
assume we need to conduct a survey for female engineers aged between 20-25.
Such a group has been formed (thus a group manager needs to distribute user
secret keys for every user). Later on, another survey for British engineers ages
between 20-25 will be conducted. Although there are some overlaps between
these two groups of people, the secret key (obtained from the first group) cannot
be reused, even for the same person since the properties of the group are fixed.
In other words, for every single survey, it is required for the group manager to
generate a new set of secret keys to every user. It is again impractical.
ABS seems to be the nearest solution. It provides user privacy. At the same
time, it also authenticates the signers for some attributes at a flexible way.
For example, assume Alice is a “female” “engineer” working in “Department
A”. Now there is a survey for all engineers in Department A. Those eligible
interviewee including Alice can use their attribute “(Engineer, Department A)”
to sign the survey. Later on, another survey for all female staff in department
will be conducted. Alice can reuse her secret key but on a different attribute set
“(Female, Department A)” to sign the survey. Different from ring signature, she
does not need to know who else users will participate the survey. Also different
from group signature, she does not need to obtain a different secret key for a
different survey.
There is just one problem that ABS cannot resolve. Since ABS is anonymous,
by no mean the verifier knows whether Alice has conducted twice or more in a
survey, as depicted in Fig 1. In the Internet world, the situation is even worse.
There are many programming scripts that can automatically submit online form.
By using these scripts, one can submit a thousand of online forms in a very short
period of time. The result will then be heavily biased. No existing designs of ABS
can detect this kind of behavior.
It is fair to say no existing solutions can perfectly resolve the contradiction
in an online survey system.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Mathematical Definitions
Bilinear Maps. Let G1,G2, GT be cyclic (multiplicative) groups of order p,
where p is a prime. Let g be a generator of G1, and h be a generator of G2.













Fig. 1. Undetectable Double Submission Using Ordinary ABS
Then ê : G1 × G2 → GT is a bilinear map if ê(g, h) is a generator of GT , and
ê(ga, hb) = ê(g, h)ab for all a, b ∈ Zp.
Mathematical Hard Problem. The security of our construction depends on
the hardness of the following problem:
Definition 1 (Decisional Diffie-Hellam Problem (DDH).). On input g,
ga, gb, Z ∈ G, decide whether Z = gab or just a random element in G. The
DDH assumption states that the DDH problem is hard for any polynomial-time
bounded algorithm.
3.2 Monotone Span Programs
Let Υ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a monotone boolean function. A monotone span
program for Υ over a field F is an `× t matrix M with entries in F, along with
a labeling function a : [`] → [n] that associates each row of M with an input
variable of Υ , that for every (x1, ..., xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, satisfies the following:
Υ (x1, ..., xn) = 1⇐⇒ ∃v ∈ F1×` such that
vM = [1, 0, 0, ..., 0], and (∀i : xa(i) = 0⇒ vi = 0).
In other words, Υ (x1, ..., xn) = 1 if and only if the rows of M indexed by
{i|xa(i) = 1} span the vector [1, 0, 0, ..., 0]. We call ` the length and t the width
of the span program, and `+ t the size of the span program.
Readers may refer to [22] for the details.
4 Overview
4.1 Basic Idea
There are three entities in our system:
– Attribute Authority (AA): It is responsible for setting up the public param-
eters and issuing user secret keys for various attributes. In practice, it can be
a government authority, computer service centre of an university or human
resources department of a company.
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– User: Any entity who has a user secret key is an user. A user can have
different attributes.
– Survey Centre (SC): It is an organization to organize a survey. It is respon-
sible to define the required policy of the survey, to collect the survey from
users and to verify the result.
Basically our system is an ABS scheme. Each user generates an ABS using his
own attributes required by the current survey. However, due to the unlinkability
property of an ABS scheme, it is not suitable to be used directly, since a user
may submit the survey more than once. We modify an ABS scheme from [22]
by adding linkability to it. That is, any verifier is able to detect whether two
signatures are generated by the same user within a single survey. Yet any user
that generates two signatures in two different surveys cannot be linked. The
survey centre can discard any double-submitted survey to maintain the accuracy
of the result.
4.2 Assumptions
We assume each user communicates with SC through an anonymous channel
[25, 14] or uses some IP-hiding technology. We also assume that the user keeps
his secret key in a safe place. This can be achieved by some external means,
such as keeping the secret key in a device to be always in possession or set it
to be password-protected. When considering some attacks such as IP hijacking,
distributed denial-of-service attack, man-in-the-middle attack etc., it is out of
the scope of this paper.
4.3 Threat Model
In this sytem, we consider the following attacks:
1. (Unforgeability Attack:) The attacker acts as an unauthorized user (who
does not possess the required attributes) who tries to submit a survey to the
SC for being accepted.
2. (Anonymity Attack:) The attacker acts as the AA colluded with the SC who
tries to find out the identity of the user of a particular submission.
3. (Linkability Attack:) The attacker acts as an authorized user who tries to
submit more than one survey to the SC for being accepted in a single survey
event.
4. (Unlinkability (for different users) Attack:) The attacker acts as an autho-
rized user who tries to submit some surveys to link with other surveys sub-
mitted by honest users. The attack may have intention to do so in order to
remove other undesirable results submitted by other users.
4.4 Notations
Notations used in our system are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1. Frequently Used Notations
TPK system parameters
APK public key of the AA
ASK master secret key of the AA
A universe of attributes
A an attribute set of a user
USK user secret key
m data or the content of a survey
event the description of a particular survey event
Υ policy of the survey
σ signature of the survey
5 Details of Our Online Survey System
5.1 The Construction
Our system consists of different phases. The detailed step-by-step construction
of each phase is given in the framed box.
Setup. The AA defines all system parameters and generates the public key and
a master secret key.
Details: The AA first generates the system parameters as follows:
1. Let ê : G1 × G2 → GT be a bilinear map (defined in Section 3.1) such
that |G1| = |G2| = |GT | = p for some prime p. Let g,G be generators
of G1 and g, h, h, h0, . . . , htmax , H be generators of G2. The value tmax
is the maximum width of the monotone span programs as defined in
Section 3.2. Let A = Z∗p be the universe of attributes.
2. Assume the DDH problem (defined in Section 3.1) is hard in G1 and G2.
Let G : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp be hash functions that will be
modeled as random oracles. The system parameters TPK is (G1, G2,
GT , ê, p, g, G, g, h, h, h0, . . ., htmax , H, H, G).
Then it generates the public and master secret keys as follows:
1. Choose a0, a, b, c ∈R Zp and compute: C = gc, A0 = ha00 , Aj =
haj , Bj = h
b
j for j = 1, . . . , tmax.
2. Choose s, v, w, z ∈R Zp and compute: U = Gs, V = Hv, W = Hw, Z =
Hz.
3. Set the public key APK as (C, A0, {Aj , Bj}tmaxj=1 , U , V , W , Z) and the
master secret key ASK as (a, a0, b, s, v, w, z). Publish both APK and
TPK while keep ASK secret.
User Key Generation. The AA issues user secret key to each user, according
to different attributes each user possesses. This is an interactive protocol between
each user and the AA.
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Details:
1. The user with an attribute set A ∈ A randomly selects L, rL ∈ Zp and
computes CL = g
LhrL ∈ G2 and sends CL to the AA.
2. The AA randomly chooses Kbase ∈R G1, r ∈R Zp and uses the master
secret key ASK to compute: K0 = K
1
a0
base, Ku = K
1
a+bu
base ∀u ∈ A,




3. The AA returns Kbase, K0, {Ku}u∈A, R, S, T to the user.
4. The user parses his user secret key SKA as (Kbase, K0, {Ku}u∈A, R, S,
T , L, rL).
Survey Submission. The SC defines a survey event and a policy such that only
those users that fulfill the policy with their attributes can participate this survey.
The user submits the survey data together with the corresponding signature
signed with his user secret key through an anonymous channel to the SC.
Details: Let m be the data and event be the description of this survey. For a
given policy Υ such that if a user with an attribute set A fulfills this policy,
we have Υ (A) = 1. First convert the policy to its corresponding monotone
span programM∈ Z`×tp (defined in Section 3.2), with row labeling function
u : [`] → A and the vector v that corresponds to the satisfying assignment
of A. The user executes the following steps with his user secret key SKA:
1. Compute µ = H(m||Υ ) and τ = G(event)L.
2. Pick r0 ∈R Z∗p, r1, . . . , r` ∈R Zp and compute Y = K
r0
base, W =
Kr00 , Si = (K
v[i]
u(i))







3. Compute Πτ as a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of
the values (R, S, T , Kbase, r0, L, rL) satisfying the following relation:
ê(R, V )ê(S,H)ê(Kbase,W ) = ê(G,Z) ∧
ê(R, T )ê(U, gLhrL) = ê(G,H) ∧
Y = Kr0base ∧
τ = G(event)L.
The details of Πτ are shown in Appendix A.
4. Submit the survey data m with its signature σ =(
Y,W, {Si}i∈[`], {Pj}j∈[t], τ,Πτ
)
to the SC.
Validity Checking. Upon received the survey, the SC checks its validity. The
checking consists of two parts. In the first part, it verifies the signature to see
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whether it is generated by a qualified user. In the second part, it checks whether
this user has submitted another survey before. Note that the user is not allowed
to submit more than one survey, no matter the content is the same or not.
Details: Upon received the data m and the signature σ, the SC executes the
followings:
1. Signature Verification:
(a) Convert the policy Υ such that Υ (A) = 1 to its corresponding
monotone span program M ∈ Z`×tp , with row labeling function
u : [`]→ A.
(b) Compute µ = H(m||Υ ) and check if ê(W,A0)
?










µ, P1), for j = 1.
ê(Cgµ, Pj), for j > 1.
(c) Checks if Πτ is a valid proof. The verification of Πτ is also shown
in Appendix A.
If all equalities hold and the proof is correct, it outputs ACCEPT and
proceeds to the second part. Otherwise it outputs REJECT.
2. Double Submission Checking: The SC extracts τ from σ and checks its
database whether any other signatures for this survey event also contain
the the same τ . If yes, that means the user has double submissions. It
then outputs REJECT. Otherewise, it outputs ACCEPT and stores the
data and signature into its database.
5.2 Security Analysis
To explain the security of our online survey system, we first present our design
philosophy in details. As discussed in Section 2, the primitive attribute-based
signature (ABS) is the closest solution to our problem. Thus, it is natural to
construct our system from an existing ABS. An ABS is a tuple of five algorithms,
namely, TSetup, ASetup, AttrGen, Sign, Ver, which are briefly reviewed below for
completeness. Interested readers may refer to [22] for their formal definitions.
– TSetup is responsible for system parameters creation.
– ASetup is the process of creating the master key of the attribute authority.
– AttrGen is invoked to certify the attribute of a user.
– Sign is responsible for signature generations.
– Ver is responsible for signature verifications.
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It is straightforward to observe the correspondence of an ABS and an online
survey system. Specifically, the Setup procedure of our system consists of TSetup
and ASetup. User Key generation procedure corresponds to AttrGen. For survey
submission, the user submits the survey response together with an ABS-signature
generated from Sign. Finally, the validity checking is realized by verifying the
ABS-signature on the survey response, that is, an invocation of the algorithm
Ver.
The security properties of any ABS, namely, unforgeability and perfect pri-
vacy would protect the resulting online survey system from unforgeability attack,
anonymity attack and linkability attack. Unfortunately, such a system will be
vulnerable under unlinkability attack. The reason is obvious, since an authorized
user can submit the survey response together with a freshly generated attribute-
based signature repeatedly without being detected. This lead to our approach,
which is to restrict the number of times a signing key can be used for each survey
event.
Our idea is to require that for each signature, the signer is required to attach
with a piece of information called tag, which is a pseudo-random function on
input of event and a secret that is known only to the user. If the user is in
possession of one single secret, for each event, he/she can only create one tag
without being detected. At the same time, since the secret is known only to the
user, no one will be able to trace this user given tag.
The final issue is to bind the user secret to his/her signing key. With this
binding, one authorized user will only be able to use the specific signing key. We
introduce the technique of “certified signing key”. Specifically, for each attribute-
based signing key issued to an authorized user, the attribute authority also
generates a standard signature on the signing key together with the commitment
of the user secret. This standard signature is used to certify that this specific
signing key is generated directly from the attribute authority and binds the
signing key to this specific user secret. At the same time, the user secret is not
revealed to the attribute authority due to the hiding property of the commitment
scheme.
Finally, whenever the user uses his/her signing key, a zero-knowledge proof
will be attached. The zero-knowledge proof serves as an evidence that the attribute-
based signature is created from a “certified” signing key and that the tag is
generated correct from event and the committed user secret.
Notes on Our Practical System. Our online survey system is built following
the above framework using the ABS from [22]. The standard signature scheme
used to certify the signing key together with the committed user secret is the
signature scheme from [1]. The user secret is just a random element from L ∈ Zp
for some prime p and that the commitment scheme is the well-known Pedersen
commitment. The pseudo-random function on the user secret and event was
defined as: F : L, event 7→ G(event)L.
It can be seen easily that the user secret key (Kbase, K0, {Ku}u∈A, R, S, T ,
L, rL) in our system can be classified into three groups.
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1. ABS signing key. (Kbase, K0, {Ku}u∈A) is exactly a signing key from the
ABS scheme due to [22]
2. User secret: (L). The Pedersen commitment of the user secret is CL = g
LhrL
and thus rL is the randomness used in the commitment.
3. Certification of the signing key. (R,S, T, L) is the standard signature (of the
scheme [1]) on the tuple (Kbase, CL).
Note that we have simplified the process of “certified signing key” by signing
Kbase and CL since each signing key is uniquely determined by the value Kbase.
The role of the zero-knowledge proof Πτ in the survey submission can be
explained easily after this classification. It states that the generator of the ABS
signature is in possession of a user secret L and that the tag τ is created correctly
from τ . In addition, the generator of the signature is creating this signature from
a “certified signing key” (i.e., he/she is in possession of a standard signature
(R,S, T, L) on the tuple (Kbase, CL) and that Kbase is used in this ABS signature
creation and CL is a commitment of L).
Now we are ready to give a security argument based on the threat model defined
in Section 4.3.
1. Security against Unforgeability Attack. Each survey response has to be
accompanied with a properly created attribute-based signature and in our
system, only authorized users are issued the signing keys. Thus, if the ABS
scheme from [22] is unforgeable, our system is secure against unforgeability
attack.
2. Security against Anonymity Attack. The only information related to
the survey participant is the ABS signature, the zero-knowledge proof Πτ
and the tag τ . Due to the perfect privacy of the ABS scheme from [22],
the ABS part leaks no information about the actual participant. The zero-
knowledge proofΠτ (details are given in Figure ??), a standard non-interactive
Σ-protocol, leaks no information due to its zero-knowledgeness (in the ran-
dom oracle model). Finally, the tag τ itself is created from G(event)L. Since L
is never shown in plain and is protected by the perfect hiding property of the
Pedersen commitment, it again leaks no information about the survey par-
ticipant. In fact, our construction provides a stronger level of privacy. Specif-
ically, if the user never participate in the same survey more than once, his
participation across different surveys are not relatable under the decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption. That is, given event1, event2, G(event1)L and a
value τ∗, it is computationally hard to tell if τ∗ = G(event2)L or not. Recall
that our system is built on bilinear groups with pairing ê : G1 × G2 → GT
such that the DDH problem is hard in both G1 and G2.
3. Security against Linkability Attack. Each authorized user in our system
is given only one “certified signing key” only and thus for each survey, he
or she can only generate one unique tag τ . This is due to the fact that the
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof Πτ is sound (i.e. the attacker cannot
produce a fake proof) and the signature from [1] is unforgeable (i.e. the
attacker cannot produce a fake certified signing key).
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4. Unlinkability (for different users) Attack. Two surveys are linked if
they share the same tag τ . In order to use a tag, the attacker has to produce
the zero-knowledge proof Πτ . That is, the attacker either produces a fake
proof or has to know the value of L that is used to generate τ . The former
is computationally impossible under the soundness property of the zero-
knowledge proof Πτ . The latter is computationally impossible under the
discrete logarithm assumption.
5.3 A Practical Example
Here we briefly describe how to deploy our system in a company. Assume there
is a multinational corporation ABC, which is working in the cosmetics business
arena. The human resources department (HR) acts as the AA to carry out the
Setup phase. When a new staff joins this corporation, the HR issues his/her
secret key by executing User Key Generation phase. The attribute set may
contain the following items: sex, marital status, location, date of birth and de-
partment. Suppose the marketing department of ABC intends to introduce a
new night cream product into its Japanese market product line. Part of the fea-
sibility study involves conducting an online survey to find out the preference of
Japanese women in the Japanese market. As a preliminary step, the marketing
department would like to conduct the survey to the staff of ABC before gathering
responses from the public. To do this, firstly the marketing department will act
as the SC. In this scenario, the targets are very clear, namely Japanese female
staffs. All the Japanese female staffs can use their secret key to sign the com-
pleted online form by using Survey Submission algorithm using the attribute
“female” and “Japanese”. The signed and completed form may be sent back to
the server through an anonymous channel. The marketing department executes
Validity Checking to check the validity of each survey. It discards any survey
which has not been signed by the attribute “female” and “Japanese”, and those
who are linked (that means duplicated copies).
5.4 Performance Analysis
Generic Analysis. We give the performance analysis of our concrete instanti-
ation described in Section 5.1. We first give a generic analysis, which varies for
different attribute sets and signing policies. We only count the time required for
exponentiation and pairing. Other operations such as hashing, group addition,
integer addition/multiplication etc. are insignificant compared with exponentia-
tion and pairing. For exponentiation, we further optimize for those bases which
are constant. It allows the use of some pre-processed data for faster computation.
For pairing, we also optimize for those such that one of the pairing elements is
a constant. We put our analyzed result in Table 2. We use tmax to represent the
maximum width of the monotone span program, |A| to represent the number of
attributes a user has, t and ` to represent the width and length of the monotone
span program converted from the signing claim policy respectively.
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Table 2. Operations required
ASetup AttrGen Sign Verify
Group G1 / G2 exponentiation 6 + 2 tmax 3 12 0(pre-processed)
Group G1 / G2 exponentiation 0 2 + |A| 2 + 2 ` + t` 6 + t`
(no pre-processed)
Group GT exponentiation
0 0 7 7
(pre-processed)
Group GT exponentiation 0 0 0 2
(no pre-processed)
Pairing (1 element is
0 0 0 5 + t
a constant)
Pairing (both elements
0 0 0 2 + t`
are not constant)
Concrete Example. Next we analyze the efficiency of our scheme using the
simulation result from jPBC [21] for the following devices:
– A desktop equiped with Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Quad CPU Q6600 2.40GHz,
3 GB RAM, Ubuntu 10.04 as the simulation device.
We measured the performance using a 160-bit secret key in elliptic curve cryp-
tosystem (ECC). It is generally believed that a 160-bit secret key in ECC pro-
vides stronger security than a 1024-bit key in RSA. We use the example described
in Section 5.3 to illustrate the exact running time and communication overhead.
In the example, we assume the following attributes:
– Sex: {Male}, {Female}
– Marriage Status: {Single}, {Married}, {Divoice}
– Office Location: {United States}, {United Kingdom}, {Australia}, {Japan},
{China}
– Year of Bith: {≤ 1960}, {1961 − 1970}, {1971 − 1980}, {1981 − 1990}, {>
1990}
– Department: {Sales}, {Finance}, {Logistic}, {Human Resources}
Now it plans to carry out some surveys based on the following different cases:
1. All staffs who are based in Japan.
2. All Female staffs who are Married.
3. All Male staffs who are based in Australia and working in the Sales depart-
ment.
4. All Female staffs who are Single, born after 1990 and based in Japan.
5. All Male staffs who are Married, based in United States, born between 1971-1980
are working in the Finance department.
6. All staffs who are based in either Australia or China and working in the Sales
department.
7. All Female staffs who are based in United Kingdom and working in either
Finance or Human Resources department.
The simulation result is shown in Table 3. The unit for running time is ms while
the unit for public parameter APK, secret key and signature is byte.
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Table 3. Performance
Case
Size of Ur. Key Gen. Size of Survey Subm. Size of Val. Check




2 182.828 520 333.185
3 350.156 560 506.893
4 517.484 600 747.12
5 721.996 640 1053.839
6 294.38 540 399.65
7 443.116 580 606.631
6 Other Applications
We note that the protocol described in this paper is specifically designed for
online survey systems. However, we do not eliminate the possibility to apply our
scheme (or modified version) in other environments if they find it suitable. We
list some of the potential applications:
Electronic Voting (E-Voting) [7, 11, 5, 13, 12, 19] is introduced to replace existing
punched-card and mechanical voting systems. With e-voting, one can cast ballots
from the comfort of his/her home or from mobile devices like cellular phones or
iPads, and this is a great convenience to people, especially those disabled and
aging population. On the other hand, e-voting also introduces a wide range
of privacy and security issues. As an example, tallying authorities want to be
assured that a ballot is from a voter satisfying certain requirements and any
eligible voter can vote only once (to eliminate double-voting), but due to privacy
concerns voters want to prevent tallying authorities from telling who they are.
One of the solutions is using linkable ring signatures [18, 20, 3, 10, 31, 4, 17].
Like normal ring signatures, linkable ring signatures provide signer anonymity
but one can verify whether or not two ring signatures were signed using the
same key. In the scenario of e-voting, the voter first creates a group of eligible
voters and then produces a linkable ring signature on the ballot. Such a signature
ensures the tallying authority that the ballot is from an eligible person in the
group but does not tell who the actual voter is, due to the anonymity of ring
signatures. Any double voting will be detected since the signature is linkable.
E-voting based on linkable ring signature has demonstrated several practice-
friendly properties, but a closer look discovers a subtle issue to be addressed,
namely how to tell if someone else is eligible for the voting when one forms a
group of eligible persons. This issue can be easily solved in some cases, e.g., “any
female staff is eligible for voting”, but not if the requirements include “anyone
with monthly income less than $1,000”. It is very unlikely that such privacy
information is publicly known, or an entity wants to share it with others. In
such cases, it would be difficult to form a group with a large number of eligible
persons, and this could put the privacy of the actual voter at risk.
Another disadvantage of linkable ring signature based e-voting system is
the requirement for voters to know the identities or public keys of all eligible
voters, especially in the case when the number of voters is very large. It is
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certainly a desirable choice if one can vote anonymously without the need to
find other eligible persons, and this reminds us of attribute-based signatures.
Each entity in attributed-based signatures is given a private key according to
the attributes he/she possesses. One can use the private key to sign the ballot,
and the resulting signature only shows that it is from a person satisfying certain
attributes (e.g., the voting requirements). Compared with ring signatures, the
advantage of attribute-based signatures is that there is no need to form a group
of eligible persons, and thus issues like “Does Alice satisfy voting requirements?”
are eliminated. However, we still need to detect double-voting if attribute-based
signatures are used in e-voting, and this would require the linkability in ABS.
Smart Grid [24] is a form of electricity network utilizing modern digital tech-
nology. The most distinctive feature in smart grid is its two-way capabilities
for data communication: Not only the grid controller can issue commands to
intelligent devices, consumers and devices can also send data to grid controllers.
This feature brings controllers and consumers with an in-depth insight of energy
usage, which would lead to a more efficient electricity system.
Attribute-based signature seems to be a promising approach to address the
aforementioned issue. Each entity is given a private key according to the at-
tributes he/she possesses. One can sign the energy consumption data using
his/her own private key, and such a signature can convince the service provider
that the data is from a person satisfying certain attributes, without the need to
seek other consumers with similar attributes. It is a natural requirement that
each data is counted only once in statistical reports, and an attribute-based sig-
nature scheme with linkability will better suit that situation. More importantly,
smart grid usually comprises big data for analysis. Attribute-based protocol
allows a constant complexity for authentication, which is independent to the
number of users in the system. Thus it is particularly suitable in this scenario.
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) allow wireless communications between
vehicles and roadside infrastructures. Chen et al. [9] addressed the problem of
reliability of information exchange between vehicles. Suppose that a car driver
Bob receives a message from another vehicle reporting some traffic jam a few
miles away, he has no idea whether the message is true or not. At the beginning,
he attempts to ignore it. But shortly after that he receives several messages (say
n) reporting the same traffic jam. If this number n is a reasonably large number
and these messages are sent by n different vehicles, this information is likely to
be true, as it seems unlikely that any n vehicles would collude to lie. However,
all these messages are sent anonymously due to privacy concern, how can Bob
find out whether n received messages are sent by n different legitimate vehicles
without discovering the identities of these vehicles? The authors proposed a
solution using Threshold Anonymous Announcement (TAA) service.
TAA allows every vehicle to obtain a token from a trusted party. One may
broadcast an anonymous message to other vehicles signed by this token so that
anyone received this broadcast message may know that it is from a legitimate
vehicle yet the identity is unknown. At the same time, TAA provides linka-
bility. That is, if a vehicle sends the same message twice, the receiver will be
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able to know these two messages are sent by the same vehicle. So it is easy
to distinguish whether n messages are from n different vehicles. However, their
scheme only provides linkability to the same message from the same signer. If
the signer slightly changes the message, e.g., change from “The city area is
very congested now.” to “Now the city area is very congested.”, they
appear as two different messages and thus cannot be linked. That is, a receiver
cannot distinguish whether these two messages are sent by the same signer.
Using linkable ring signature may resolve this issue, because linkable ring sig-
nature provides event-based linkability. In a single event (e.g., traffic congestion
announcement in the city area), any two signatures generated by the same singer
will be linked, no matter the two signed messages are the same or not. Never-
theless, linkable ring signature requires the signer to know the identities of all
legitimate vehicles in the area, which is impossible. An event linkable attribute-
based signature provides a better solution because it does not require anyone to
know other legitimate vehicles, while providing event-based (instead of message-
based) linkability. Simultaneously anonymity of the signer is also preserved.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a new insight to preserve accuracy and privacy in
online survey systems simultaneously. The new insight comes from our proposed
system. We proved the security of it. The performance analysis is also given
to show that our system is efficient and practical. In addition to online survey
systems, we further suggested several other applications that can make use of our
new system, including e-voting, smart-grid and vehicular ad hoc networks. We
believe our system is particular suitable for handling big data as the complexity
remains constant, regardless to the number of users.
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A Details of Πτ
Πτ can be constructed in the random oracle model using 19 elements.
Let g1, g2 be generators of G1 and h1, h2 be generators of G2. They can
be regarded as part of TPK. The signer randomly chooses x1, . . . , x6 ∈R Zp,
computes: X1 = g
x1
1 g2
x2 , X2 = Rg
x2
1 , X3 = Sg1




2 , X5 =
Kbaseg
x5
1 , Y1 = Th
x6
1 . The signer also randomly chooses ρ1, . . . , ρ13 ∈R Zp and




















2 , T5 =
ê(g1, V )
ρ2 · ê(g1, H)ρ3 · ê(g1,W )ρ5 , T6 = ê(X2, h1)−ρ6 · ê(g1, Y1)−ρ2 · ê(g1, h1)ρ8 ·
ê(U, g)ρ12 · ê(U, h)ρ13 , T7 = Xρ115 g
−ρ10
1 , T8 = G(event)ρ12 . Then, the signer
computes k = H(T1 . . . || T8||X1|| . . . ||X5|| Y1||m|| event||Υ ) and computes:
z1 = ρ1 − kx1, z2 = ρ2 − kx2, z3 = ρ3 − kx3,
z4 = ρ4 − kx4, z5 = ρ5 − kx5, z6 = ρ6 − kx6,
z7 = ρ7 − kx1x6, z8 = ρ8 − kx2x6, z9 = ρ9 − kx4r0,
z10 = ρ10 − kx5r0, z11 = ρ11 − kr0, z12 = ρ12 − kL, z13 = ρ13 − krL.
Parse Πτ as (k, X1, . . ., X5, Y1, z1, . . . , z12). It consists of 5 elements in G1, one
element in G2 and 13 elements of Zp.
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kG(event)z12 . Accept the proof if and only if:
k
?
= H(T′1 . . . ||T′8||X1|| . . . ||X5||Y1||m||event||Υ ).
